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1. Introduction 
Eric McCready 
University o/Texas at Austin 
This paper considers the semantics and pragmatics of two Japanese adverbial expres­
sions, yoku and yokumo, instances of which are shown in ( 1 )  and (2) . 'PI" is used to 
gloss sentence-final particles here and in what follows. 
( 1 )  a. Yoku koko ni kita na ! 
YOKU here to came PI' 
'You came here, and 1 am surprised/happy that you did.' 
b. Yoku ore 0 damasita na! 
YOKU me ACC tricked PI' 
'You tricked me, and 1 am surprised you were able to .' 
(2) a. Yokumo koko ni kita na! 
YOKUMO here to came PI' 
'You have a lot of guts to come here ! '  
b .  Yokumo ore 0 damasita na! 
YOKUMO me ACC tricked PI' 
'I can ' t  believe you had the gall to trick me.' 
The purpose of the present paper is to describe the meaning, distribution, and 
felicity conditions of these adverbials, and to provide a formal account of them within 
a version of dynamic semantics. 
2. Meaning of yoku(mo) 
We can think of yoku and yoku(mo) as expressing the attitude of the speaker to the 
proposition cp in their scope. Both express that cp is surprising, but differ in that yoku 
expresses that the speaker feels positively about cp, while yokumo expresses that the 
speaker feels negatively about cpo Other subtle differences exist, as will be shown 
below. 
It should be noted that other uses of yoku (but not yokumo) exist, on which 
it means 'often' or 'well,' as in (3a) and (3b) respectively. This pattern, in which a 
complex use of an adverbial is parasitic on a more extensional use, is common cross­
linguistically. Waltereit (2001 )  cites German ja, which means 'yes ' but also can be 
used as a modal particle, and eigentlich, which ordinarily means 'proper' but also has 
a use as a relevance-marking particle. The particle use of ja will be discussed further 
in a later section. 
(3) a. Taro ga yoku biirn 0 nomu 
Taro NOM often beer ACC drinks 
'Taro often drinks beer.' 
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b. Kono ronbun wa yoku dekita mon da ne. 
this paper TOP well done thing COP PT 
'This paper is nicely done.' 
In what follows, I will often write yoku(mo) to mean 'yoku and yokumo' ,  
where the two exhibit similar behavior. 
2. 1 Characterizing the meaning ofyoku(mo) 
I argue that the meaning of yoku(mo) is complex, and includes a statement of the 
speaker's attitude to the proposition in the adverbial 's  scope and location of that 
proposition on an exclamative-like scale of likelihood. 
A first attempt at the compositional semantics of the two adverbials might 
look like this :  
• [yoku]= Ap. [good(p) ] 
• [yokumo]= Ap. [bad(p) ] 
This is not quite right, for a number of reasons .  The first reason is that there is 
a crucial difference between yoku and yokumo: the former may express a general 
attitude, while the latter may not. 
In the following example, use of yokumo indicates that the Kings '  victory 
was bad for the speaker in some way, perhaps a lost bet. Yoku, conversely, simply 
expresses regard for the Kings ' success. 
(4) a. Kings-wa yoku Wolves-ni geemu-wan de kateta na 
Kings-TOP YOKU Wolves-DAT game-one in could-win PT 
' I 'm amazed and pleased that the Kings beat the Wolves in Game 1 .' 
b.  Kings-wa yokumo Wolves-ni geemu-wan de kateta na 
Kings-TOP YOKUMO Wolves-DAT game-one in could-win PT 
' I 'm shocked and personally inconvenienced by the fact that the Kings 
beat the Wolves in Game 1 .' 
Thus the semantics must express that the badness affected the speaker in the yokumo 
case. It is simple to modify the lexical entry for yokumo to reflect this difference. 
Here bad(s , p) should be read 'p is bad for the speaker' :  
• [yokumo]= Ap. [bad(s , p) ] 
However, these lexical entries still do not capture the full meaning of the 
adverbials,  for two reasons. First, the meaning of the adverbials includes an element 
of shock or surprise that does not appear yet in the semantics. Second, there are 
complex issues with the deniability of sentences including yoku(mo).  
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2.2. Problem 1 :  Exclamatives 
I will claim that the semantics of yoku(mo) is related to that of exclamatives like the 
sentence in (5), and that the ' surprise' part of their meaning comes from this scalar 
component. 
(5) What a nice guy John is ! 
Exclamative clauses have several properties related to yoku(mo) (Zanuttini 
and Portner, 2003) :  first, they are factive, and second, the proposition that is the 
denotation of the clause is located at the end of a pragmatically determined scale: 
often a scale of likelihood. Yoku( mo) does not seem to be factive in the standard 
sense, for reasons to be discussed below, although sentences including yoku(mo) do 
entail the truth of the modified proposition. However, the meaning of these adverbials 
does seem to have a scalar component. 
I use the following scale, which is based on discussion of even in Guerzoni 
2003 . In words, <p is more likely than 'lj; in w iff, given a contextually relevant set of 
facts, the likelihood of <p is greater than that of 'lj; .  
• <p > Lw 'lj; iff r F= Likelihood( <p) > Likelihood( 'lj; ) , where r i s  a set of 
contextually relevant facts in w .  
Given this scale, we may revise the entries for yoku and yokumo as follows, 
where C is a set of contextually relevant propositions which are also on the scale of 
likelihood. : 
• [yoku]= Ap. [good(p) 1\ Vq E C [ (p =J q) -+ q >Lw p] ]  
• [yokumo] = Ap. [bad(s , p) 1\ Vq E C [ (p =J q) -+ q >Lw p] ]  
These formulas state that yoku( mo )(  <p) is true iff <p is goodlbad and is the least likely 
proposition in w of some set of propositions, given a set of contextually relevant 
facts. 
The denial problem will be addressed after the next section, in which I will 
set up some background. 
3. Particles and information states 
This section addresses the following observation: both yoku and yokumo require that 
the proposition to which they apply already be in the common ground. This fact can 
be seen clearly by attempting to use them in answers to questions (cf. Kratzer 1 999) , 
which must express new information from the perspective of the questioner (barring 
rhetorical questions). In this context, use of yoku(mo) is impossible. 
(6) a. Context: A asks B 'Who did Austin marry?' 
b. *Yoku Dallas to kekkon sita na t 
YOKU Dallas with marry did PT 
'He did a really good and surprising thing by marrying Dallas ! '  
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(7) a. Context: A asks B 'Who did Austin marry?'  
b .  *Yokumo Dallas to kekkon sita na t 
YOKUMO Dallas with marry did PT 
'He did an amazingly stupid and shocking thing by marrying Dallas ! '  
The badness of the examples above shows that yoku( rno) cannot simply be analyzed 
as factive, for if it could, the proposition in its scope could be accommodated in this 
situation ; the question itself indicates A's willingness to accommodate. 
However, it is perfectly possible to use yoku(mo) if the proposition it applies 
to is already in the common ground, as in (8). Here, since my friend is aware of his 
own actions, he already knows that he has drawn the picture in question. 
(8) a. Situation : I go to a gallery where a painting by a friend of mine is being 
exhibited. I am surprised at the quality of his work. A few minutes later 
he shows up and I say: 
b .  omae-wa yoku konna e-o kaketa 
you-TOP YOKU this-kind-of picture-ACC could-draw 
'I can't  believe you could draw a picture this good.' 
I model the requirement for hearer knowledge in a variant of a dynamic sys­
tem developed by Asher and McCready (2004) . In this system, information states 
are enriched to triples a = (8 ,  £S (8) , £1£ (8) ) ,  where £ is a function from subsets 8 
of W, the set of worlds, to epistemic possibilities, which are subsets of p(W) . £s 
represents the epistemic state of the speaker, £1£ that of the hearer. An epistemic state 
is taken to be the set of ' live' possibilities for the individual to which £ is relativized. 
Which participant is speaker and which hearer switch with dialogue turns. I assume 
the existence of functions 1 , 2 and 3 that map respectively to the first, second, and 
third elements of the information state. The first element, 1 (a) , is a model of the 
discourse itself, updated just as in standard DPL (Groenendijk and Stokhof, 1 99 1 )  
except that the elements are sets of worlds rather than world-assignment pairs . Since 
the topic of this paper does not involve anaphora, I have no need for assignments, and 
so leave them out to simplify the discussion; the semantics provided could easily be 
extended to include assignments should they be needed. 2 (  a) is the set of possibili­
ties that are 'live' for the speaker, while 3 (a) is made up of the possibilities that are 
'live' for the hearer. Both 2 (a) and 3 (a) live on l (a) , so the following entailments 
hold: 2 (a) 1= l (a) and 3 (a) 1= l (a) . 
Within this system, a given utterance can be associated with conditions on the 
ISs of speaker and hearer. In particular, the knowledge condition on yoku(mo) can 
be characterized as follows: 
• a + Y ( <p) = a' if 
- \If E 2 (a) [f + <p = f] , and 
- \If E 3 (a) [f + <p = f] 
else 0 .  
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In words : for the update to be defined, all the speaker's epistemic possibilities must 
verify cp and all the hearer's possibilities must also verify cpo Assuming mutual knowl­
edge, the result is that cp must be in the common ground. 
What happens when it's not clear whether the hearer already knows cp? The 
condition above is not satisfied in this situation. It seems that, in this case, the 
sentence-final particle na is obligatory. 
(9) When cp = came_here(j )  ¢: CG: 
a. # John yoku(mo) koko ni kita ! 
John YOKU(MO) here to came 
'John was really good (had a lot of guts) to come here ! '  
b .  John yoku(mo) koko ni kita na ! 
John YOKU(MO) here to came PT 
'John was really good (had a lot of guts) to come here ! '  
Among many other uses (Moriyama, 200 1 ;  Noda, 2002) ,  na can b e  used to 
emphasize and seek agreement on a statement. 
( t o) kinoo ame-ga ippai futta na 
yesterday rain-NOM lots fell PT 
'It rained a lot yesterday.' 
Here, the speaker emphasizes his own belief that ' it rained a lot yesterday' , and 
expresses the belief that the hearer is aware of this fact and agrees with his judgement 
about it. One way to understand this intuition is that use of the particle implies 
the speaker's certainty that cp is true and that the hearer also believes so. We can 
characterize this idea as follows in our system (thanks to Kai von Fintel for helping 
clarify an error in an earlier version of this formula) : 
• [na] = Ap.N A(p) 
• (1 + N A(cp) = ( 1 ((1) + cp, 2 ((1) , 3 ((1) + cp) if: 
- 2 ((1) + cp = 2 ((1) 
- 2 ((1) + Vw' E DOXH (W) [CP(W') ]  = 2 ((1) 
- 3f E 3 ((1) [f + cp = f] 
else 0. 
On this analysis, na is eliminative just in case: the proposition in its scope is entailed 
by all the speaker's epistemic possibilities, the speaker believes that the proposition 
is true in all belief worlds of the hearer (DOXH (W) , the set of worlds doxastically 
accessible to the hearer in w), and the hearer has not already rejected the proposition. 
Use of na thus expresses a stronger claim by the speaker than an ordinary assertion 
due to the constraints on its use. The strength of this claim leads to the emphatic 
quality of na-marked assertions, and the possibility of accommodation by the hearer. 
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4. Problem 2: Denial 
Having set the stage, we may now return to the lexical semantics of these adverbials. 
What happens when yoku(mo)+<p is denied? The above analysis predicts several 
possibilities, each corresponding to one bit of the semantics (see Faller 2002 for 
more on this 'denial test' ) .  
• Case 1 :  Hearer's information state does not actually support <po Then the truth 
of <p is denied. 
• Case 2: Hearer's IS supports <p but not goodlbad( <p) . Then the appropriateness 
of the attitude is denied. 
• Case 3 :  Hearer's IS supports <p and possibly goodlbad( <p) ,  but not that <p is 
unexpected. Then the unexpectedness is denied. 
• Case 4: Hearer's IS supports <p but neither of the other parts, which are then 
both denied. 
The semantics provided above predicts that Case 1 is impossible, because <p must 
already be in the hearer's IS for the sentence to be successfully processed, but that 
cases 2-4 are possible. Let us see whether these predictions are borne out. 
( 1 1 )  A: Taro-ga yoku annani ii e-o kaketa na 
Taro-NOM YOKU that-kind-of good picture-ACC could-draw PT 
'I 'm surprised and pleased that Taro could draw such a good picture.' 
a. B: #Uso da ! 
lie COP 
'That's a lie ! '  
b .  B :  Tigau yo ! 
wrong PT 
'That's wrong ! '  ==> 'It's not that positive a fact.' OR 'It's not that sur­
prising.' 
C .  B: sonna koto nai yo 
that-kind-of thing COP.NEG PT 
'That's not right.' ==> 'It's not that positive a fact.' OR 'It 's not that 
surprising.' 
( 1 2) A: Taro-ga yokumo ano ko-o nagutta na 
Taro-NOM YOKUMO that kid-ACC hit PT 
'I 'm surprised and shocked that Taro hit that kid.' 
a. B: #Uso da ! 
lie COP 
'That's a lie ! '  
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b. B :  Tigau yo ! 
wrong PT 
'That's wrong ! '  ===> 'It's not that positive a fact. ' OR 'It's not that sur­
prising.' 
c .  B :  Sonna koto nai yo ! 
that-kind-of thing COP.NEG PT 
'That's not right.' ===> 'It's not that positive a fact.' OR 'It 's not that 
surprising.' 
As it turns out, Case 1 is indeed impossible. This is unsurprising: since cp 
must be supported, it may not be denied felicitously. The analysis so far gets this 
right. Cases 2 and 3 are both possible. This is also predicted. Case 4 is impossible. 
This is surprising. Some modification seems necessary. 
Before doing this modification, however, one may wonder why denial with 
uso ' lie' is impossible. I believe that the cause of this is just that A has privileged 
access to his own mental states (Mitchell, 1 986), so B is able only to question the 
characterization, not to dispute its sincerity. ( 1 3) is bad for the same reason. 
( 1 3) a. A: I 'm cold. 
b. B: # That's a lie ! 
I will present a solution to the denial problem that makes crucial use of speech 
acts as related to discourse structure. This solution will be situated within Segmented 
Discourse Representation Theory (SDRT), a theory of discourse interpretation that 
enriches standard DRT with discourse relations that hold between speech act tokens 
(Asher and Lascarides, 2003). In SDRT, each speech act introduces an individual 
SDRS labelled with a speech act referent; this is written 'Trn : Kn , where 'Tr labels 
K, which is an SDRS or a dynamic formula representing the content of an SDRS. 
Individual speech act tokens are integrated into a larger discourse structure with bi­
nary discourse relations R, so for all 'Trj , R('Tri ' 'Trj ) for some 'Tri . R may be lexically 
determined or follow from inference. 
I argue that yoku(mo) introduces a complex SDRS-condition (cf. the analy­
sis of parentheticals in Asher 2000) . The basic idea is that yoku(mo) has a complex 
meaning. On my analysis, it introduces into the discourse model three distinct propo­
sitions : the proposition cp already assumed to be present in the ISs of speaker and 
hearer, a proposition that expresses the speaker's attitude toward cp (generally bad), 
and a proposition that locates cp on a scale of likelihood, just as discussed earlier. 
The difference from the earlier proposal is that each of these propositions is taken 
to be labeled with a distinct speech act referent; as with Asher's (2000) analysis of 
parentheticals,  the effect of this move is that the content of the subordinate speech 
acts does not participate in relations with logical operators such as modals and con­
ditionals, as needed for examples like ( 14) . The speech act referents introduced by 
yoku( mo) are then connected by underspecified discourse relations. 
( 14) a. If the party, an uninteresting social gathering, is over, then we should find 
somewhere else to get a drink. (Asher 2000) 
b. =1= If the party is over and the party is an uninteresting social gathering, 
then we should find somewhere else to get a drink. 
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This representation corresponds to the following SDRS-conditions . I ignore 
the speaker orientation of yokumo for simplicity. 
7rl : cp 
7r2 :goodlbad(cp) 
7r3 : V'l/J E C[('l/J =I- cp) -+ 'l/J >Lw cp] 
Commentary (? , 7r2 ) 
Background(? , 7r3) 
The attachment points of 7r2 and 7r3 are not set. I assume a constraint on 
attachment such that both 7r2 and 7r3 must attach to 7rl ' Crucially, however, the order 
in which they attach, is underspecified. This yields two possibilities: 
7rl : cp 
7r2 : good/bad( cp) 
7r3 : V'l/J E C[('l/J =I- cp) -+ 'l/J >Lw cp] 
CommentarY(7rl , 7r2 ) 
Background(7rl , 7r3 )  
and 
7rl : cP 
7r2 : good/bad ( cp) 
7r3 : V'l/J E C[('l/J =I- cp) -+ 'l/J >Lw cp] 
Background(7rl , 7r3 )  
CommentarY (7rl , 7r2 )  
Taking discourse relations to connect nodes, these representations correspond 
to the following graphs : 
and 
7r2 7r3 7r3 7r2 
where CommentarY (7rl , 7r2 ) and Background(7rl , 7r3 ) .  
In SDRT, denial targets a single SDRS (Asher and Lascarides, 2003) .  The 
targeted SDRS must be on the right frontier of the discourse structure: 7r is available 
only if it is the most recent utterance or lies on a path between the node represent­
ing it and the root of the graph. Given the structures above, it is only possible to 
target 7rl , 7r2 , or 7r3 . Targeting 7r2 with negation yields Case 2: denial of the atti­
tude. Targeting 7r3 yields Case 3 :  denial of surprisingness. It is also possible to 
target 7rl ' In SDRT, when an SDRS is denied, SDRSs that are connected to it with 
veridical subordinating relations are also denied; that is ,  denial is transitive through 
veridical relations . Veridical relations are those that fulfill the following condition: 
R(7ri , 7rj )  -+ 9n, i F K7ri /\ K7rj /\ CPR, where CPR is the content introduced by the 
relation. Veridical relations thus are those relations that entail the truth of the two 
SDRSs they connect, as well as the truth of any additional content that comes from 
the relation itself. In SDRT, Commentary and Background are veridical relations. 
Therefore, if denial targets 7rl , 7r2 and 7r3 in the structure above are also denied by 
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transitivity. However, since 71"1 is already supported by the input state, targeting it 
results in a contradiction and thus infelicity. 
Interestingly, some speakers seem to allow denying the attitude and scalar 
content simultaneously. For such speakers, the condition requiring attachment to 71"1 
does not seem to hold. In this case, the range of attachment possibilities widens 
significantly, admitting the following structures : 
71"1 and 71"1 
I I 
71"2 71"3 
I I 
71"3 
In the structure on the left, two possibilities exist for denials .  Denial may 
either target 71"3 , in which case the surprisingness of the proposition is denied, or it 
may target 71"2 . In this second case, 71"3 is also denied, by transitivity. The structure on 
the right admits a similar range of possibilities . The upshot is that, for these speakers , 
everything but the modified proposition itself (71"I )may be denied simultaneously. 
What happens when we add the sentence-final particle na to the SDRS? It 
must apply to the first proposition-that is, to the content of 71"1 ,  in order to ensure 
the right conditions on the input state. Thus, only the content of 71"1 changes with the 
addition of na, meaning that the following SDRSs can be constructed: 
71"1 : NA(ip) 
71"2 : goodjbad(ip) 
71"3 : V'ljJ E C[('ljJ # ip) -+ 'ljJ >Lw ip] 
Commentary (71"1 , 71"2 ) 
Background(71"1 , 71"3 ) 
and 
71"1 : NA(ip) 
71"2 : goodjbad (ip) 
71"3 : V'ljJ E C[('ljJ # ip) -+ 'ljJ >Lw ip] 
CommentarY (7rI , 7r2 ) 
Background(71"I , 71"3 ) 
In the remainder of the paper I will use the earlier formalism when writing 
out lexical entries for yoku(mo) to enhance readability. 
4. 1 German ja  
A number of  researchers have examined the modal use of  the German particle ja 
from a semantic perspective in recent years (cf. Kratzer 1 999; Potts 2003 ; Kaufmann 
2004). As it turns out, ja and yoku( mo) share a number of common properties. First, 
ja also has requirements on hearer knowledge, and cannot be used as the answer to a 
question (Kratzer, 1 999; Kaufmann, 2004) . 
( 1 5) a. Context: A asks B 'Who did Austin marry?' (Kratzer, 1 999) 
1 7 1  
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b. * Austin hat ja  Ashley geheiratet 
Austin has JA Ashley married 
'Austin married Ashley.' 
Second, it appears that ja cannot be embedded under modals, which, as we 
will see shortly, is a property shared by yoku(mo) : 
( 1 6) *Es ist moeglich, dass Hans ja  einen neuen Hund hat. 
it is possible that Hans JA a new dog has 
'It is possible that Hans JA a new dog has .' 
I will have little to say here about the correct analysis of ja, but will sim­
ply note that the analysis proposed by Kaufmann (2004) for the ' shared knowledge' 
requirement of ja has much in common with mine. Kaufmann analyses ja ( r.p) as 
presupposing r.p within a system of dynamic modal logic. The conditions on input in­
formation states I propose are ultimately quite similar. In principle, presuppositions 
can be accommodated, but Kaufmann shows that the particular presupposition he as­
sumes (that of mutual knowledge) is difficult to accommodate, making predictions 
similar to my own. I leave the question of whether his system could also apply to 
yoku( mo) for future research. 
5. Distribution of yoku(mo) 
This section describes the distribution of these adverbials, which are extremely re­
stricted. In short: yoku(mo) is very difficult to embed, and further may only apply 
to certain types of proposition. I argue that this difficulty stems from a restriction on 
yoku(mo) :  the sentence that it applies to must describe some actual past or current 
state of affairs. I will provide evidence for this claim from constructions with modals, 
conditionals, attitude verbs, and negation, showing that yoku( mo) is only possible in 
these cases when the sentence it applies to is coerced to a description of an actual 
eventuality, or, in the case of attitude verbs, when the sentence can be understood as 
quotative. 
Modals: Neither yoku nor yokumo can appear with future-oriented modals ( 1 7, 1 8) ,  
either within their scope, as in ( 1 7a) and ( 1 8a) ,  or scoping over them, as in ( 1 7b) and 
( 1 8b) . Note that although I use the possibility modal kamosirenai in these examples, 
the same facts hold for other sorts of future-oriented modals, such as the necessity 
modal nitigainai, although I omit the relevant examples here for space reasons. Past­
oriented modals are possible, however, as shown by ( 1 9) .  
( 1 7) a. * [Yoku koko ni kita] kamosirenai nat 
YOKU here to came might PT 
'It is possible that you did really well to come here ! '  
b. *Yoku [koko ni kita kamosirenai] nat 
YOKU here to came might PT 
'It is possible that you did really well to come here ! '  
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( 1 8) a. * [Yokumo koko ni kita] kamosirenai na t 
YOKUMO here to came might PT 
'Maybe you have a lot of guts to come here ! '  
b .  *Yokumo [koko ni kita kamosirenai] na t 
YOKUMO here to came might PT 
'Maybe you have a lot of guts to come here ! '  
( 1 9) omae yokumo konna ii sakuhin dekita n ya na 
you YOKUMO this-kind-of good artwork was-able-to EMPH COP PT 
'I can' t  believe you were able to make a piece this good ! '  
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Why does this restriction exist? Two scopal possibilities exist for these sen­
tences : Modal (Adv ( <p) ) ,  where the modal scopes over the adverbial ,  or Adv (M odal ( <p) ) ,  
the opposite scoping. The first case is probably out for pragmatic reasons. Given the 
discussion in the previous section, the modal applies only to <p, not to the content 
of the adverbial ,  yielding Modal ( <p ) . However, recall that the proposition yoku( mo ) 
applies to must be already known to the hearer. Given this fact, asserting Modal ( <p ) 
would violate Gricean maxims and so be pragmatically odd. 
This explanation, however, does not help in understanding why it is impossi­
ble to apply yoku(mo) to Modal (<p) , for this proposition could well still be informa­
tive. The reason this scoping is out is, 1 argue, that yoku(mo) is lexically restricted 
so that it cannot be used to indicate one's attitude to situations that are not actually re­
alized. Since future-oriented modalities by definition describe (possibly) unrealized 
situations, the scoping in question should be impossible if this hypothesis is correct 
Consider the following: 
(20) (*)Taro-ga yoku(mo) raigetu Tokyo ni iku na 
Taro-NOM YOKU(MO) next.month Tokyo to go PT 
'It's surprising and good (bad) that Taro will go to Tokyo next month.' 
If this sentence is interpreted as expressing an attitude toward Taro's trip to Tokyo 
(not Taro's decision to go to Tokyo next month) , infelicity results . Similarly, if we 
interpret (b) to describe a general capacity rather than one that contributed to the 
success of a particular action, it is ungrammatical ; ( 1 9) in fact does not describe an 
ability, but the actual fact of having painted a picture of high quality. 1 will call 
propositions that describe situations that have occurred in the actual world actual 
propositions .  
Conditionals: Yoku(mo) is also impossible in conditionals :  it may not apply to the 
antecedent or consequent ((a) and (b) for yoku, (a,b) for yokumo), or to the whole 
conditional . 
(2 1 )  a. *Yoku koko ni kitara, shachoo ga okoru daroo 
YOKU here to came-if, boss NOM get-angry probably 
'If you do really well to come here, the boss will probably get angry.' 
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b. *Taro ga sake 0 nomitakattara, yoku koko ni kuru daroo 
Taro NOM alcohol ACC want-drink-if, YOKU here to come probably 
'If Taro wants to drink, he will be likely to do really well to come here.' 
(22) a. *Yokumo koko ni kitara, shachoo ga okoru daroo 
YOKUMO here to came-if, boss NOM get-angry probably 
'If you have a lot of guts to come here, the boss will probably get angry.' 
b. *Taro ga sake 0 nomitakattara, yokumo koko ni kuru 
Taro NOM alcohol ACC want-drink-if, YOKUMO here to come 
daroo 
probably 
'If Taro wants to drink, he will probably have a lot of guts to come here.' 
Given the discussion of the modal case, these facts are not unexpected. If cp 
or 'IjJ are already known to be true, one should not assert cp -+ 'IjJ ;  thus the infelicity 
of applying yoku( mo) to conditional antecedent or consequent. And, if yoku( mo) re­
quires that the proposition in its scope be actual, we can also explain why applying 
yoku(mo) to the whole conditional is bad too. 
Negation: Yoku(mo) can appear under negation (23 ,24). However, like the modal 
cases, in these cases the sentence seems to serve as a negative description of a positive 
event (cf. Miller 2003),  as in (25) .  If this is correct, then negated sentences provide 
further evidence that yoku(mo) requires actual propositions. 
(23) a. Yoku koko ni konakatta na ! 
YOKU here to came PT 
'You didn't  come here, and I am surprised you were able not to .' 
b .  Yoku ore 0 damasanakatta na ! 
YOKU me ACC tricked PT 
'You didn't  trick me, and I am surprised you forbore. (one reading) ' 
(24) a. *Yokumo koko ni konakatta na ! 
YOKUMO here to came-not PT 
'You have a lot of guts to not come here ! '  
b .  *Yokumo ore 0 damasanakatta na!  
YOKUMO me ACC not-tricked PT 
'I can't believe you had the gall to not trick me.' 
(25) John saw Mary not leave. 
I characterize these facts formally by putting a condition on the type of propo­
sition which can saturate the A-term in the lexical entry of yoku { rno) to the effect that 
the proposition must describe a situation whose temporal trace is located at a past 
time, or one that is ongoing at the present moment. The need for admitting situations 
that are still happening at the speech time is made clear by progressivized sentences 
like (26) : 
Two JAPANESE ADVERBIALS AND EXPRESSIVE CONTENT 
(26) Omae-ga yoku(mo) konna koto-o yat-teru na 
you-NOM YOKU(MO) this .kind.of thing-ACC do-PROG NA 
'I 'm surprised you are able to (have the guts do) be doing this kind of thing.' 
The condition is implemented in the form of a presupposition (the formula contained 
within braces in the lexical entries below) .  Effectively, this condition selects for the 
set of actual propositions. The final lexical entries for yoku and yokumo are then as 
follows, where the predicate Desc( e, cp) is true iff cp describes the eventuality e : 
• [yoku] = Ap{3e[T (e) = t /\ t ::; n /\ Desc(e , p) /\ p(wo) ] } . [good(p) /\ Vq E 
C[ (q =I p) -+ q >Lw p] ]  
• [yokumo]= Ap{3e[T (e) = t /\ t ::; n /\ Desc(e , p) /\p(wo ) ] } . [bad(s ,  p) /\ Vq E 
C[(q =I p) -+ q >Lw p] ]  
Use of  these adverbials now presupposes that 3e [T(e) = t /\ t ::; n] ; that there be 
an eventuality that took place either in the past or at the present moment n. T in this 
formula is the temporal trace function that returns the runtime of an eventuality. The 
additional condition p( wo)  additionally requires the proposition to hold in the actual 
world, and so forces the eventuality to have taken place there. 
Attitudes: Yoku(mo) cannot be embedded under attitudes in the general case. The 
sentences below are ungrammatical when yokulyokumo modifies the proposition that 
is the object of the attitude. 
(27) a. * [Yoku(mo) koko ni kita na] to sinzita 
YOKU(MO) here to came PT COMP believed 
' (You) believed I was really good (bad) to come here.' 
b.  * [Yoku(mo) koko ni kita] to sinzita na ! 
YOKU(MO) here to came COMP believed PT 
' (You) believed I was really good (bad) to come here.' 
They are fine, however, when the object modified by the adverbial is the proposition 
that such-and-such was believed. (ba) , for instance, is acceptable on the interpretation 
'You were good to believe that I came here ! '  Here, yoku(mo) modifies the entire 
sentence, and hence the actual proposition that describes the act of believing. 
Why is modification of the embedded sentence impossible? There are several 
possibilities . One is that the proposition modified by yoku(mo) must be asserted. 
If this is correct, we can see why modifying the embedded sentence is impossible : 
asserting Att(x , cp) does not entail the assertion of cpo A second possibility is that 
yoku(mo) is tied to root clauses, and so cannot apply to embedded sentences except 
under very special circumstances. (This suggestion is due to Pranav Anand.) In the 
end I will reject both of these possibilities, however, showing that this restriction, like 
those observed above, follows directly from the actuality condition on propositions 
modified by yoku(mo). 
One way to decide between the possibilities is to examine sentences that lack 
assertive force, such as questions and imperatives. In these contexts , (at least some) 
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root phenomena are permitted, but since no assertive force is present, elements re­
quiring assertion are not. As the examples below show, yoku(mo) is impossible in 
questions and imperatives, which makes the assertion-based analysis appear to be 
the correct one. 
(28) a. *Taro-ga yoku(mo) ano ko-o nagutta no ka? 
Taro-NOM YOKU(MO) that kid-ACC hit EMPH PT 
'Was Taro good (bad) to hit that kid?' (bad unless echo question) 
b.  *yokumo sara-o arattekoi !  
YOKUMO plate-ACC wash-corne-IMP 
'Go wash the plates and surprise and inconvenience me by doing so ! '  
Before concluding that assertion i s  necessary for use o f  yoku( mo), however, 
we should consider again the actuality condition introduced above. There, I required 
that the proposition yoku(mo) applies to describe a proposition that describes a situ­
ation temporally located in the past or overlapping the present, in the actual world. 
Crucially, complements of attitude verbs do not have this property. Attitude verbs de­
scribe what holds in the belief worlds of the speaker (in the case of sinziru 'believe ' ) ;  
thus, although the proposition may describe a past eventuality, i t  is not actual in  the 
necessary way. Therefore, the condition on actuality of propositions is sufficient to 
derive the impossibility of using yoku( mo) in attitude objects as well .  
Quotatives: Yoku(mo) can be embedded under attitude verbs just in case that verb 
can be construed as quotative, as in (29). 
(29) a. [Yoku(mo) koko ni kita] to omotta na! 
YOKU(MO) here to came COMP thought PT 
' (You) thought (I) did a good (bad) thing to come here ! '  
b .  [Yoku(mo) ore 0 damasita] to omotta na ! 
YOKU(MO) me ACC tricked COMP thought PT 
' (I) thought you did a good (bad) thing to trick me.' 
For these examples to be grammatical , we have to construe my thought as 
having had the form expressed by the sentential complement. In the case of quoted 
thoughts, standard semantic restrictions and interactions do not apply, as shown by 
many authors (see e.g. Schlenker 2003 for discussion) . For this reason, the gram­
maticality of examples like these does not constitute a genuine counterexample to the 
generalizations made here. That these sentences are quotative can be verified by in­
cluding indexicals in the complement, as in (30) ; ore is a masculine, low-register first 
person pronoun that sounds natural with yoku(mo) , both of which are low-register and 
tend to be associated with masculine or rough speech. 
(30) Indexicals in complement: 
a. John-wa [ore-ga yoku(mo) koko ni kita] to omotta na ! 
John-TOP I-NOM YOKU(MO) here to came COMP thought PT 
'John thought he did a good (bad) thing to come here ! '  NOT 'John 
thought that I did a good (bad) thing . . .  ' 
Two JAPANESE AoVERBIALS AND EXPRESSIVE CONTENT 
b. John-wa [yoku(mo) ore 0 damasita] to omotta na ! 
John-TOP YOKU(MO) me ACC tricked COMP thought PT 
'Johni thought (he) did a good (bad) thing to trick mei .' NOT 'John 
thought that (he) did a good (bad) thing to trick the speaker' 
I should note that there may be additional restrictions (on, for instance, intentionality, 
agentivity, and disjunction), but speaker judgements are inconsistent, and so I do not 
consider these issues here. 
6. Conclusions 
I have shown in this paper that yoku(mo) requires prior knowledge or a discourse 
particle to be felicitously used. When felicitous, it expresses a speaker attitude to 
the proposition it applies to, and states that it is unexpected. I modelled these facts 
in a dynamic semantics incorporating elements from SDRT. I further showed that 
yoku(mo) can apply only to propositions that describe events that have taken place in 
the actual world. 
I would like to close with a final comment. The meanings given for yoku( mo ) 
can switch polarity in certain contexts ; the positive meaning of yoku can become 
negative, as in (3 1 a) ,  and the negative attitude expressed by yokumo can become 
positive, as in (3 1 b), repeated from ( 1 9) .  
(3 1 )  a .  omae yoku ano i i  ko-o naguru ki-ni natta na 
you YOKU that good kid-ACC hit feeling became PT 
'I 'm shocked at you for deciding to hit that kid.' 
b .  omae yokumo konna ii sakuhin dekita n ya na 
you YOKUMO this-kind-of good artwork was-able-to EMPH COP PT 
'I can' t  believe you were able to make a piece this good ! '  
The positive/negative meanings of these expressions are probably best regarded as 
defaults which can be overriden by pragmatic information. For instance, the polar­
ity switching of yokumo in (b) presumably comes about because there is ordinarily 
nothing negative about being able to produce good artwork. Similar facts have been 
noted by Potts (2003) with respect to epithets. The switching may also be related to 
intonational contour. 
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